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nificant in the extension of liability to the manufacturer -and his
smaller margin of profit. But concern for the welfare of the food con-
sumer should not be dampened by undue concern for the economic
welfare of the wholesaler. The wholesaler, being in privity of con-
tract with the manufacturer, should be able to recover from him on his
warranty in any jurisdiction the judgment paid the injured consumer.
The burden placed upon him by the necessity of suing in the manu-
facturer's state should be counted as part of the price he pays for the
patronage of the consumer, who usually can ill afford to bear the
burden himself.
AUBREY V. KENDALL
WILLS: DEVOLUTION OF LAPSED PORTION OF RESIDUE
Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Smoot, 135 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1955)
The testator's will left the substantial residue of his estate to his
two sisters in equal shares. One sister predeceased the testator, leaving
no issue. The executor brought proceedings for construction of the
will, requesting, inter alia, an instruction as to disposition of the resi-
due. HELD, in the absence of the testator's manifest intent to create
a joint tenancy, residuary legatees, who are described by name are
tenants in common, and that portion to which a predeceased legatee
would have been entitled if living passes as intestate property.
In the absence of a controlling statute American courts generally
have held that lapse of a portion of the residue, whether realty or
personalty, does not inure to the benefit of the surviving residuary
legatees but passes under the applicable laws of intestacy. 2 Upon
consideration of the argument that this rule does violence to the
general presumption against intestacy as well as to the probable intent
of the testator, a number of courts3 have adhered to the rule with
'The lapsed residuary portion may be realty or personalty. As used herein,
the term "legatees" contemplates the donees of either type of property.
2E.g., Buffinton v. Mason, 327 Mass. 195, 97 N.E.2d 538 (1951); Matter of
Hoffman, 201 N.Y. 247, 94 N.E. 990 (1911); Bronson v. Penney, 130 Conn. 262, 271,
33 A.2d 322 (1943) (dictum); Sorrells v. McNally, 89 Fla. 457, 472-73, 105 So. 106,
112 (1925) (dictum); cf. Hurt v. Davidson, 130 Fla. 822, 178 So. 556 (1937).
3E.g., Wright v. Wright, 225 N.Y. 329, 122 N.E. 213 (1919); Gray's Estate, 147
Pa. 67, 23 At. 205 (1892).
CASE COMMENTS
some reluctance; a growing minority of courts4 and most writers5
have rejected it for a rule favoring the surviving residuary legatees.
Those courts that remain faithful to the rule are skeptical of the
proposition that there can be a residue of a residue 6 or hesitate to
endow the surviving residuary legatee with more than they conceive
to be the specific proportion of the residue set aside for him by the
testator.7 If, however, the residuary legatees are held to be members
of a classs or joint tenants,9 the problem generally is resolved in favor
of the survivors.
At common law, in the event of lapse outside the residue, realty
descends as intestate property 0 but personalty passes to the residuary
legatees." In order to abolish this distinction, several states enacted
statutes - that direct to the residue all property contemplated by a
lapsed devise or bequest outside the residue and expressly denote the
surviving residuary beneficiaries as recipients of lapsed portions of
the residue itself. Other states, including Florida,' 3 Colorado, 14 and
the District of Columbia," have broad lapse statutes that apparently
4E.g., Hedges v. Payne, 85 Ind. App. 394, 154 N.E. 293 (1926); Corbett v. Skaggs,
111 Kan. 380, 207 Pac. 819, (1922); Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Browning, 158 Ohio St.
54, 107 N.E.2d 120 (1952); see In re Estate of Zimmerman, 122 Neb. 812, 241 N.W.
553 (1932); cf. Will of Nielsen, 256 Wis. 521, 41 N.V.2d 369 (1950).
'E.g., 36 HARV. L. REv. 230 (1922); 18 VA. L. Rav. 333 (1932); 7 Wyo. L.J. 143
(1953). Contra, 23 ROCKY MIT. L. REv. 220 (1950).
GSee, e.g., Dresel v. King, 198 Mass. 546, 85 N.E. 77 (1908); Lyman v. Collidge,
176 Mass. 7,56 N.E. 831 (1900). But see Corbett v. Skaggs, I11 Kan. 380, 386, 207 Pac.
819, 822 (1922) (dictum).
7See Skrymsher v. Northcote, I Swanst. 566, 36 Eng. Rep. 507 (1818); cf. Pelton
v. First Say. & Trust Co., 98 Fla. 748, 124 So. 169 (1929).
8See Roberts v. Tamworth, 96 N.H. 223, 73 A.2d 119 (1950); In re Long's Estate,
121 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1953).
9See Smith v. Savin, 31 Del. Ch. 347, 73 A.2d 785 (1950); Estate of Hoermann,
234 Wis. 130, 135, 290 N.V. 608, 610 (1940) (dictum).
1OE.g., Crawford v. The Mound Grove Cemetery Ass'n, 218 Ill. 399, 75 N.E. 998
(1905); Trinity Meth. Episc. Church, South v. Baker, 91 Md. 539, 46 Atl. 1020 (1900).
"E.g., English v. Cooper, 183 Ill. 203, 55 N.E. 687 (1899); Batchelder, Petitioner,
147 Mass. 465, 18 N.E. 225 (1888); Leggett v. Stevens, 185 N.Y. 70, 77 N.E. 874
(1906).
1N.J. STAT. ANN. 3A:3-14 (1953); OHio REv. CODE ANN. 2107.52 (Page 1953);
P.. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §180.14 (10) (Purdon 1950); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 566, §7 (1938).
13FLA. STAT. §731.20(2) (1955): "If a legacy or devise is void or lapses, it shall
become a part of the residuum and shall pass to the residuary legatee or devisee
unless a contrary intent is expressed by the testator in his will."
14COLo. R v. STAT. ANN. §152-5-11 (1953).
"5D. C. CODE ANN. §19-110 (1951).
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abolish the distinction between realty and personalty in this context
but fail to provide specifically for disposal of lapsed portions of the
residue. The courts of Colorado-6 and the District of Columbia 7 have
held that the missing provision is not to be implied from the statute;
the Florida Court has yet to meet the problem.
The court in the instant case followed controlling precedent 8 in
ruling that the lapse statute did nothing to abrogate the common law
rule or to enhance the rights of surviving residuary legatees.
By these decisions the operations of two imperfect lapse statutes
were confined to dissolving the distinction between lapsed bequests of
personalty and lapsed devises of realty occurring outside the residue.19
This avenue is not so easily traveled by the Florida Court. The dis-
tinction between realty and personalty under a lapsed devise or be-
quest outside the residue was abolished by statute20 in Florida forty-
one years prior to the enactment 2' of the lapse statute.
A legislative amendment to the present statute to the effect that
the surviving residuary legatees may share the lapsed portion in pro-
portion to their existing shares would provide the most satisfactory
solution of this problem. In the absence of legislation two alternatives
are before the Florida Court. It may perpetuate the common law
generosity to the heirs, as has been done in Colorado and the District
of Columbia, or it may construe the statute as encompassing lapse both
in and out of the residue and award a lapsed residuary portion to
the surviving residuary legatees. 22 A choice of the former alternative
apparently would declare the Florida lapse statute to be devoid of
significance and merely repetitive of existing statutory law. Whether
the Court will be receptive to the latter alternative may depend on
'
8 Estate of Boyle, 121 Colo. 599, 221 P.2d 357, (1950), af'd, 123 Colo. 448,
231 P.2d 465 (1951).
"7George Washington Univ. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 88 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
'18bid.
19See also Patterson v. Reed, 260 Pa. 319, 103 At. 735 (1918).
20F1 . REv. STAT. §1794 (1892), Hurt v. Davidson, 130 Fla. 822, 178 So. 556
(1937). The last compilation containing this statute as enacted is FLA. GEN. LAws
ANN. §5459 (1927). This section was superseded by part of the current probate
chapter, Fla. Laws 1933, c. 16103, §6, as amended, FLA. STAT. §731.05 (1955). Al-
though the language of the present statute differs somewhat from that of the
original enactment, the legal effect appears to be the same.
2"Fla. Laws 1933, c. 16103, §21.
22E.g., Snellings v. Downer, 193 Ga. 340, 18 S.E.2d 531 (1942); Corbett v. Skaggs,
111 Kan. 380, 207 Pac. 819 (1922). But see Kent v. Kent, 106 Va. 199, 55 S.E. 564
(1906).
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the strength of its belief that most men by making wills evince their
intent to avoid intestacy. On numerous occasions the Florida Court
has declared the testator's intent to be controlling,23 even when con-
fronted with a statute that dictates a result opposite to that apparently
intended by the testator.24 The comparative equitable claims of the
litigants whose case first comes before the Court may well determine
the weight assigned to the testator's intent and thus indirectly de-
termine the ultimate destination of a lapsed residuary portion.
SHELDON J. PLAGER
23E.g., State v. North, 159 Fla. 351, 32 So.2d 14 (1947); In re Estate of Ida
Eustis, 148 Fla. 665, 5 So.2d 254 (1941); Brickell v. Di Pietro, 145 Fla. 23, 198 So.
806 (1941).
24Williams v. Williams, 152 Fla. 255, 9 So.2d 798 (1942).
